1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

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this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid n.d.: 19-27).

F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional system. Range improvement projects were carried out with disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the mintaqa) in the desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on their property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygyny as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was not taken into account. The government estimated five persons per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families. They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local cooperative society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of government business, and others cannot afford the 50 piasters membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course, but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

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747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
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571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
177 as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e., pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system of meanings in terms of which social action takes place (Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one. But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently of a specific cultural structure.

571 672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance, *613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is 571 672 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not *613 •426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt [558] [681] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis- 682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they *613 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an 829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question 124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion, which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment 682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function 681 of the 'aqila, and even the condition of his taking office, 182 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from 571 the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

681 this variation is that committing the adultery within the camp of the
558 husband constitutes a greater humiliation, since it affects his honor
684 among his neighbors. Also, adultery inside the tent of the couple carries with it the possibility of rape, while adultery outside the tent at least implies an element of consent on the part of the wife. The
[583] penalty in the case of adultery is the return by the wife's father of the mahr and all other expenses of the marriage ceremony and the gifts the husband had presented during the engagement period. This is a further indication that the father of the wife is still responsible for her behavior even after she is married. It is in this respect that the crime of adultery differs from theft. In the case of theft, the
[685] thief has to return twice the amount stolen and in the case of repeated offenders, four times the amount stolen. This is in addition to a certain amount of money as kabara. Yet, in the latter case the kabara is not specified and is subject to the proof by the victim that the theft constituted an insult to him. This insult is assumed in the case of adultery, which makes the kabara in the case of adultery part of the punishment--an integral part of the punishment. The kabara is not among
[613] the collective responsibility of the amar and is paid only by the person involved, unless he is totally unable to pay or refuses to pay. In such
• 426 cases, his closest male kin (his father, son, or brother) pays on his
593 behalf with the understanding that such payment constitutes a debt which
681 should be repaid. The person paying on his behalf in this case can go
684 to his tent and take by force anything of value, such as blankets, uten-
558 sils, or even sheep and goats, and keep them as pawns until the debt is paid.

9: Murray E, K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, and only the old men have memories of their former warlike habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War, but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1] So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them "green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger, and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully to the men of their own tribe.

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit

[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls.